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Added Burden Of Viet War Shifts To U.S.

Cong Dig In

From an Article by George Meti Kahin and John W. Lewis in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists June, 1965

The Vietcong has for some time now controlled substantially the same amount of territory — and in most cases the same areas — *in South Vietnam* as did the Vietminh in 1953-54. . .

The French under General Henri Navarre made their major military effort in 1953-54 not on the assumption that they could defeat the Vietminh but as a necessary step in building a position of greater strength from which to negotiate. Similarly, the US now insists that greater military power must be brought to bear before we can attain a suitable position for negotiations.

American efforts to build up an anti-communist government in Vietnam began at least five years before the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina and were initially undertaken in cooperation with and in support of the French . . .The Truman administration backed France in her efforts to reimpose military control. In adopting this policy, Truman's advisors were hoping that either concurrently or following the re*establishment* of such control, France would grant a substantial measure of independence to a noncommunist Vietnamese government. But that hope rested on a fundamental error in assessing Vietnamese political forces and was shattered politically quite as dramatically as it was militarily with the debacle of Dien Bien Phu. During its early efforts to build up a Vietnamese government, Washington failed to appreciate the extent to which Ho Chi Mihn and the Vietminh were regarded as the symbol of Vietnamese nationalism — for most noncommunists as well as communists. And the US, by associating itself with France's effort, took its first step toward making the Vietnamese cynical about American protestations of support for national self-determination. . .

This failure left two important political legacies: first, the Vietminh had gained overriding control of Vietnamese nationalism; and second, most rural Vietnam, South as well as North, had become accustomed to being administered by the Vietminh and had reason to be loyal to it. In the eyes of the Vietnamese peasant, the Vietminh had rid the country of colonial rule and had enacted beneficial social reforms, especially in the agrarian sphere. . .

Yet despite these inherent disadvantages, soon after the Geneva Conference the US for the second time attempted to establish an anti-communist Vietnamese government. . .There was one crucially important, though temporary and in a sense artificial, advantage which the US enjoyed. This derived from the unequivocal provision in the Geneva Accords that elections would be held in July 1956, under international supervision, to unify the country under one government. In anticipation of these elections (and also

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

Today's special issue intended as a point of departure for a continuing discussion of the war in Vietnam. Pages 1-3 offer some background information on the Vietnam, the United States commitment, and the military and political conflict. Editorial comment, including faculty articles, appears on pages 4 and 5.

This issue is not meant to be conclusive, but only to open debate. The Chronicle invites comment on the war from any member of the University community.

North Reels From Attacks

from an article by Bernard B. Fall in The New York Times Magazine July 10, 1966

The bombs that have fallen around Hanoi and Haiphong have shifted the focus of the whole Vietnam War away from the guerilla - infested swamps and jungle of the south to the little and backward Asian country (the size of Georgia, with a population of 19.8 million people) that apparently is willing to take on the United States single - handed.

Most Western visitors to North Vietnam have come back with uniform impressions — of "bleak austerity". . . All such views simply depict the results of 20 years of guerilla Communism, of a decade of forced — march "Socialist construction," and of 18 *months of war* with the mightiest power on earth, the United States. . . .

Born as the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRVN) on Sept. 2, 1945, under the presidency of Ho Chi Minh —and recognized as a "free state, with its own government, parliament, army and finances," by the French in 1946— the Hanoi regime has lived ever since on a roller - coaster of near - disasters and seemingly hopeless wars. Plunged into a eight - year war through the machinations of a Saigon - based french colonial bureaucracy which simply outmaneuvered its own weak home government, the DRVN defeated the French despite the desperate odds. At the ensuing ceasefire conference at Geneva in 1954, she won almost one-half of the country and over 60 per cent of its population, as we well as a doubtful promise to win the rest two years later in an election which never took place.

As in every other Communist coun-

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

'Quiet War' Faltering

From an article by Denis Warner in the Reporter December 1, 1966

On the outskirts of Danang, just beyond the southern limits of the airbase, is the village of Hoa Toa (Quang Nam Province). Last November, new bamboo fences appeared around the hamlets, which were then officially declared pacified. Five months later, after the government forces charged with keeping the main - force enemy units out of the area had abandoned their posts and gone off to join the Buddhist melee in Danang, the Vietcong entered the hamlets and slit the throats of the hamlet chiefs.

Today the national pacification center for Quang Nam Province has withdrawn to a safer haven, and the whole pacification program here is under urgent review. In every way, this is a sobering place to begin inquiries into the Revolutionary Development Program, that "other war" on which, in the long term, peace and progress in Vietnam so obviously depend.

The new Revolutionary Development Program in fact involves a great change in organization, direction, finance, and planning (from past failures). *But it is easy to understand the* peasants' failure to appreciate not only the finer points between what the Diem regime attempted and what General Nguyen Duc Thang, the dynamic Minister of Revolutionary Development, hopes to achieve today but also the differences between what the Communists and the anti - Communists have in mind. For the past six years a succession of administrations has flattered the Vietcong by copying their methods and tactics.

The Revolutionary Development Program was meant to be in large part imitative. It is the outgrowth of a small - scale operation launched by two Americans, Frank Scotton and Bob Kelly, in Quang Ngai Province in 1963. Kelly and Scotton handpicked their recuirts. After thirty days of basic indoctrination in everything from Mao Tse-tung's theories of revolutionary war-

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

Presidents Cite War Cause

The origin of American participation in the Vietnam War lies in the pledges of three American presidents to the leaders of South Vietnam. The following excerpts describe in part the nature of the American commitment.

Message from President Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam, October 22, 1960.

Dear Mr. President:

. . . Although the main responsibility for guarding that independence will always, as it has in the past, belong to the Vietnamese people; and their government, I want to assure you that for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Letter from President Kennedy to President Diem, December 14, 1961.

Dear Mr. President:

. . . the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They have thus violated the provisions of the Geneva Accords designed to ensure peace in Vietnam and to which they bound themselves in 1954.

At that time, the United States, although not a party to the Accords, declared that it "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." We continue to maintain that view.

In accordance with that declaration, and in response to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independenc. We shall promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort . . .

John F. Kennedy

Toward Peace with Honor: Press Conference statement by the President, The White House, July 28, 1965.

Why must young Americans — born into a land exultant with hope and golden with promise — toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?

The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one . . . We have learned at a terrible and brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace.

The Nature Of The War

This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations . . . It is guided by North Vietnam and spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism . . .

The Stakes In Vietnam

Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist the growing might and grasping ambition of Asian communism. Our power, therefore, is a vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise, or in American protection. In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened. And an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would imperil the security of the United States itself.

We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else . . .

Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents —President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President — over 11 years, have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation.

We cannot now dishonor our word or abandon our commitment or leave those who believed us and who trusted us. . .

This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Vietnam.

What are our goals in that war-stained land?

First: We intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power . . .

Behind our American pledge lies the determination and resources of all of the American Nation.

Steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement . . .

Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable . . . I have stated publicly, and many times, America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any government at any place at any time.

In this pursuit we welcome, and we ask for, the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations. If the United Nations and its officials — or any one of its . . . members — can by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and the gratitude of the United States of America.

We do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory. But we insist, and we will always insist, that the pople of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the South, or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision. And they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it.

This was the purpose of the 1954 agreement which the Communists have now cruelly shattered . . . Its purposes still guide our action.

As battle rages, we will continue as best we can to help the good people of South Vietnam enrich the condition of their life — to feed the hungry, to tend the sick, teach the young, shelter the homeless, and help the farmer to reap his crops, and the worker to find a job . . .

It is now my opportunity to help every child get an education, to help every Negro and every American citizen have an equal opportunity, to help every family get a decent home and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to the old . . .

And I do not want to see all those hopes and all those dreams of so many people for so many years now drowned in the wasteful ravages of war.

But I also know, as a realistic public servant, that as long as there are men who hate and destroy we must have the courage to resist, or we will see it all, all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams of freedom — all swept away in the flood of conquest.

So this too shall not happen; we will stand in Vietnam.

Vietnam Policy Contradictory

The following excerpts from statements made by various American spokesmen reflect our changing policy toward the war in Vietnam.

From an Article
By TOM WICKER
The New York Times
November 27, 1966

President Kennedy, Feb. 7, 1962: "We are there on training and on transportation, and we are assisting in every way we properly can. . ."

President Kennedy, Feb. 14, 1962: "As the war has increased in scope, our assistance has increased as a result of the requests of the government . . . We have not sent combat troops there, although the training missions that we have there have been instructed if they are fired upon to—they would, of course, fire back, to protect themselves."

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, March 15, 1962: "We are there at the request of the South Vietnamese Government to provide training. . . ."

Secretary McNamara, May 9, 1962: "There is no plan for introducing combat forces in South Vietnam."

President Kennedy, Sept. 2, 1963: "In the final analysis, it it is their war they are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We an help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it — the people of Vietnam — against the communists."

Presdident Johnson, Feb. 21, 1964: "The contest in which South Vietnam is now engaged is first and foremost a contest to be won by the Government and the people of that country for themselves."

Secretary of State Dean Rusk Feb. 27, 1964: "No miracle in the north is going to suddenly transform or eliminate the problem in South Vietnam."

Secretary McNamara, May 15, 1964: "I think we should recognize that our primary function is one of training, support and logistical assistance."

Secretary Rusk, Sept. 14, 1964: "The courses we are following and have been following for many years under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy and Johnson is the course of helping the Republic of Vietnam with our experience and our resources to put down the Communist campaign of terror and subversion and to forget the machinery of stable government in their own country."

President Johnson, Sept. 25, 1964: "We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. We don't want to yet involved in a nation with 700 million people and get tied down in a land war in Asia. . ."

President Johnson, Sept. 28, 1964: "What I have been trying to do, with the situation that I found, was to get the boys in Vietnam to do their own fighting with our advice and with our equipment. . . .So we are not going north and drop bombs at this stage of the game, and we are not going south and run out . . . We are going to continue to try to get them to save their own freedom with their own men. . . ."

President Johnson, April 7, 1965: "In recent months attacks on South Vietnam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires. . ."

Secretary McNamara, June 16, 1965: "But this has not been enough. Therefore we're seeking to correct the unfavorable manpower balance by the addition of combat forces from other nations — Australia, United States and Korea."

President Johnson, July 28, 1965: "If we are driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise, or in American protection."

Seretary McNamara, Nov. 12, 1965: "We believe it will be necessary to add further to the strength of the United States combat forces now deployed in Vietnam."

President Johnson, Feb. 11, 1966: "There will be additional men needed and they will be supplied as General Westmoreland is able to use them and as he may require them."

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Feb. 17, 1966: "(A counter-strategy) evolved out of the experience of the preceding months and years and assumed its full form with the critical decisions in 1965 to introduce U.S. ground forces and to initiate the bombing campaign against military targets in the north. Both of these courses of action had been under consideration at least since November, 1961, when I presented my report to President Kennedy."

President Johnson, June 24, 1966: "We sincerely feel that the national interest requires that we persist in our present policy. . . .I must observe that this does not mean that we shall not increase our forces or our operations. . . ."

President Johnson, to the troops at Camranh Bay, South Vietnam, Oct. 26, 1966: "Come home with that coonskin on the wall."

Geneva Bans

The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, dated July 21, 1954, was drawn up with the participation of the United States and said in part:

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as all kinds of arms and munitions. .

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties. . . .

7. . . . .In order to insure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July, 1956. . . . .

Excerpts from the American Statement made by Under Secretary Walter B. Smith in Geneva on July 21, 1954:

The Government of the United States. . .declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs (the inter - state agreements and the provisions of the Geneva Conference) that it will refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them. . .and it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern as seriously threatening international peace and security . . .

In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.

With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not enter into an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

Senate Hearings Reveal Split In War Attitude

Early this year, in an unprecedented move, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator William Fulbright, a frequent critic of administration policy in Southeast Asia, held open, telecast hearings on the war in Vietnam. Following is testimony by four key witnesses at the hearings.

(Following are portions of the testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk)

Fulbright: Can you define our objective in terms of what we seek to achieve?

Rusk: To put it in its simplest terms. Mr. Chairman, we believe that the South Vietnamese are entitled to a chance to make their own affairs and their own future course of policy: that they are entitled to make these decisions without having them imposed on them by force from North Vietnam or elsewhere from the outside . . .

Fulbright: Do you think they can be a completely free agent with our occupations of the land . . .

Rusk: If the infiltration of men and arms from the North were not in the picture, these troops of ours would come home.

Sen. George D. Aiken (D-Vt.): Is there any doubt in *your mind* that North Vietnam can stop the aggression in South Vietnam if they so desire?

Rusk: . . . Hanoi has some independence to stop sending men and arms into South Vietnam if they chose to do so . . . There are elements of civil war in this situation, but the heart of the problem of peace is the external aggression.

Sen. Joseph Clark (D-Pa.): . . . I am scared to death we are on our way to a nuclear World War III.

Rusk: For four years there was infiltration from the North before there was any bombing of North Vietnam . . . the escalation has been escalation by the North . . . If the other side would de-escalate and get these infiltrators home, things could move very fast, sir . . .

Aiken: Are we bound to fight communism wherever it exists?

Rusk: No, sir, we are not. But . . . where Communist countries undertake to commit aggression against those to whom the United States has undertaken commitment in an alliance, that there we have a duty to assist our allies to meet that aggression.

Aiken: What is the extent of our commitment in South Vietnam . . .

Rusk: . . . The commitment is contained . . . in the language of the SEATO Treaty, where it says:

"Each party recognizes that agression by means of armed attack would endaner its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will, in that event, act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Aiken: Would you say there is a limit?

Rusk: I am not going to say that this country has accepted in advance a certain point beyond which it will not go in meeting its commitments. . .

(Following are excerpts from the statement and testimony of George F. Kennan before the committee on Feb. 10. Mr. Kennan is a former ambassador to Yugoslavia, former member of the State Department's Planning Staff and is now a professor at Princeton's Institute for Advanced International Studies.)

The first point I would like to make is that if we were not already involved as we are today in Vietnam, I would know of no reason why we should wish to become so involved, and I could think of several reasons why we should wish not to.

Vietnam is not a region of major military, industrial importance. It is difficult to believe that any decisive developments of the world situation would be determined in normal circumstances by what happens on that territory.

I have great misgivings about any deliberate expansion of hostilities on our part directed to the achievement of something called "victory" — if by the use of that term we envisage the completed disappearance of the recalcitrane with which we are now faced, the formal submission by the adversary to our will, and the complete realization of our present stated political aims.

Any total rooting out of the Viet Cong from the territory of South Vietnam could be achieved, *if it could be achieved* at all, only at the cost of a degree of damage to ivilian life and of civilian suffering generally for which I would not like to see this country responsible.

Not only are great and potentially more important questions of world affairs not receiving, as a consequence of our involvement in Vietnam, the attention they should be receiving, but in some instances assets we already enjoy and hopefully, possibilities we should be developing are being sacrificed to this unpromising involvement . . .

Our relations with the Soviet Union have suffered grievously, as was to be expected, and this at a time when far more important things were involved in those relations than what is ultimately involved in Vietnam.

Sen. John J. Williams (R-Del): Recognizing that we are at this point, that we have a couple of hundred thousand men in there, my next question is, what should we do now?

Kennan: I would recommend that we not expand either our own commitment of men and we try to limit the conflict rather than to expand it; that we adopt in general a defensive strategy .. .

(Following is the testimony of Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, U. S. Army (Ret.) before the committee on Feb. 8, as well as the basic text of his article in the January issue of "Harper's Magazine" which projected the general into the center of the controversy)

My comments are based entirely upon a tactical evaluation of our efforts there.

SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK

Today we have sufficient forces in Vietnam to hold several enclaves on the coast, where sea and air power can be made fully effective. By enclaves I suggest Camranh Bay, Da Nang, and similar areas where Amerian bases are being established. However, we are stretching these resources beyond reason in our endeavors to secure the entire country of South Vietnam from the Viet Cong penetration. This situation, of course, is casued by the growing Viet Cong strength. . . . If we were to quadruple, for example, our combat forces there, we should then anticipate the intervention of the Chinese "volunteers" and the reopening of the Korean front. This seems to be the ultimate prospect of the course that we are now on.

Fulbright: He (Gavin) did say the initiative is now with the Chinese, did he not?

Gavin: I feel in Vietnam, yes. This is what I said a moment ago, and this is what makes me uneasy. The escalation is not occurring at our will as much as it is in response to the esalation of the opponent, who is supported by the Chinese.

So the choice is not whether we will be in Vietnam; we are there. But to use with judgment and discretion what we do there: this is what I maintain we should do.

(Gen. Maxwell Taylor testified before the committee on Feb. 17. Taylor, a veteran of World War II and Korea, served as Ambassador to Vietnam and is now a military consultant to President Johnston. His testimony follows.)

A simple statement of what we are doing in South Vietnam is to say that we are engaged in a clash of purpose and interest with the militant wing of the Communist movement represented by Hanoi, the Viet Cong and Peking.

The purpose of the Hanoi camp is perfectly clear and has been since 1954. It is to absorb the 15,000,000 people of South Vietnam into a single Communist state under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and his associates in Hanoi.

Our purpose is equally clear and easily defined. In his Baltimore speech of April 7, 1965, President Johnson did so in the following terms: "Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves — only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way."

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Gentlemen, I think a simple answer to the question, what are we doing in South Vietnam, is to say that for more than a decade we have been takin gsides in a cause in which we have a vital stake.

How are we doing in the pursuit of our objectives in South Vietnam? Both sides in the struggle have over the years developed the current strategies which are now in confrontation.

In brief, the strategy which we have been and are pursuing consists of four components.

The first includes the many activities directed at increasing the effectiveness of our ground combat against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam.

The second component of our stratey relates to the use of air power against military targets in North Vietnam.

The third component of our current strategy includes all of those non - military activities which are so important but which receive too little public attention.

The fourth component of our strategy is that which relates to our political and diplomatic efforts to initiate the discussion of a peaceful settlement of this conflict.

In summary, then, our four-point strategy consists of a complex but coherent package of measures designed to improve the effectiveness of our forces on the ground in South Vietnam, to exploit our air superiority by attacking military targets in North Vietnam, to stablize the political, social and economic system in South Vietnam ,and to seek an honorable negotiated settlement of the conflict.

Vietcong Still Popular

(Continued from page 1)

because of its preoccupation with the economic rehabilitation of the North), the Vietminh initially honored a central provision of the Accords and abstained from militant tactics in the South. The American - sponsored Ngo Dihn Diem government thereby won a reprieve lasting several years in which it could have built up popular support. . . .

It was obviously a much surprised Vietminh that came to realize during 1955-56 that the French were disengaging from the responsibilities they had accepted at Geneva — thereby permitting the introduction of an increased American presence — and that elections were not going to be held. When on July 16, 1955, the Diem government announced, with American backing, that it would defy the provision calling for national elections, it violated a central condition which had made the Geneva accords acceptable to the Vietminh. . .

Despite a substantial period of insulation from Vietminh militancy, despite unstinting American economic and political backing, Diem failed to develop a real base of popular support. As a result, his government was unable to withstand competition with the Vietcong guerillas when from 1958 on they adopted increasingly militant policies. After this, even in those areas not yet effectively penetrated by the Vietcong and where a security problem had not yet arisen, Diem's government could not secure the loyalty of most of the population.

In the rural areas it fell short in all its attempts to attract the support of the Vietnamese people. Programs urged by the US for the improvement of social and economic conditions, for winning the allegiance of the non - Vietnamese mountain - dwelling peoples, and for the establishment of strategic hamlets were generally unsuccessful. The consequence was an ever greater alienation of the population. .

Since the assasination of Diem the situation. . .continued to deterioriate and the shifting combinations of army officers controlling the government. . .remained just as isolated from the Vietnamese people. . .

Against a confident, powerful adversary, the South Vietnamese forces semed inept and undisciplined on the battlefield, and additional areas fell under Vietcong control. . .

In late 1964, dissension in the ranks of the army began to accompany an increased civilian disenchantment with the Saigon government. By January 1965 the army was experiencing grave difficulty in conscripting recruits, an average of thirty per cent of whom were reportedly deserting within weeks of their enlistment . . .

The increasing areas south of the seventeenth parallel from which Saigon has been ousted have not become administrative vacuums. Into most of them has moved a fully functioning Vietcong administration. The Vietcong now controls more of rural South Vietnam than Saigon does, and at night, when Saigon's military patrols return to their bases, the area which the Vietcong administers expands still further.

The Vietcong cadres are not isolated strangers in an unfamiliar land. Most, recruits and hard core alike, are southerners with deep local roots, familiar with the area and living in what they rightly regard as their homeland. . .Indeed, the Vietcong has consistently been far more sensitive than Saigon to the strong regional sentiment characteristics of politics throughout Vietnam.

Undoubtedly it was in part in order to come to terms with this regional feeling in the South that the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam — the NLF — was established in December 1960. Whatever the extent of its loyalty to Hanoi, the Vietcong has depended on southern support and has felt obliged to give the Liberation Front a distinctly southern slant. . .

Although the NLF leaders undoubtedly have close ties with Hanoi, there is evidence suggesting that the Front has a significant degree of autonomy and independence of action . . .

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Make Peace Not War

There are too many things wrong with this country's Vietnam policy. This has been said many times before. More and more people are listening. We want to be believe that the United States is pursuing the right course, but increasingly we cannot. What is wrong bears repeating.

We have expended 5000 lives and billions of dollars without cause and without gain. Our commitment in Vietnam is a State Department fiction based on requests for aid from Vietnamese heads of state who remained in office only because of U. S. support. We are told that if we do not honor this "commitment" in Vietnam that other countries will loose faith in our promises to them. This is a shallow excuse for our continued military presence in Vietnam in light of the criticism of our policy by many allies and non-aligned nations. Our repeated escalation of the war to now include heavy bombing of North Vietnam has brought us no nearer to the negotiation table, despite assurances at each step that it would. It succeeds only in driving the enemy toward a closer alliance with Red China.

We are fighting supposedly for the right of the Vietnamese people to self-determination. Yet, it was the United States that called off the elections in 1956. The U. S. military have now taken nearly entire responsibility for the burden of the war. The South Vietnamese army never as motivated as the Vietcong or the few North Vietnamese units in the war, is no longer contributing to the struggle for democracy.

The United States must move more decisively toward a settlement. It cannot police the world and it cannot stand in the way of change, even if it means that the people of Vietnam or some other country decide to live under a form of government different from our own. We can move toward a settlement by agreeing to negotiations with the enemy—the Vietcong—and to arbitration by a third party. Then, after the war has ended, we must wage peace by spending the billions we would have spent on destruction to help build (and rebuild) Vietnam and in that way demonstrate our desire to help the people.

Vietnam & The 'New Left'

By H. C. BOYTE

Our country is involved in a bloody, savage war in Vietnam, where the toll in lives and suffering is incalcuable to us in sheltered white America. "New Radicals" react almost instinctively against the justifications piously propagated by our government for our involvement.

Perhaps the most important factor in our disbelief stems from the repeated demonstration that America does not truly value human dignity at home. The superstructures that provide some people with rich comfort are hollow to the extent that they are built no the suffering and degradation of many at home and abroad.

As an example, to deny the Negro his es sential personhood (meager "first steps" n o t withstanding) is in a real sense to demonstrate the shallowness of our own self-understanding. A definition of what makes people good based on the color of one's skin is a tragically superficial conception of human beings. Such a definition not only inflicts severe damage upon Negro Americans, it also obscures the sacredness of all human life. In view of historic and contemporary America, we cannot believe our government is motivated by altruism.

Secondly, the logic of the State Department is bankrupt in its pretensions to defend democracy. If our foreign policy is based on protection of freedom, where have our troops been when Spain was invaded, when dictatorships have arisen again and again in Latin America, when Portugal refused to relinquish its cruel colonial pclicies in the 1950's and '60's? Instead of standing with the legitimate aspirations of suffering, poverty-ridden people, we consistently support the centers of priviledge and exploitation in the world.

Rather, we see our policy in Vietnam as an extension of our paranoia about communism, a paranoia at least partially derived from our fear of revolutionary disruption of the "rights" or our businessment to invest safely in any profitable location.

We ask for the end of an arrogant intervention. America has too long thwarted the revolutions of colored peoples, too long refused to let people make their own successes and mistakes in developing their own systems of government out of their indigenous heritages.

By Dr. Robert M. Marsh

Unrealistic Vietnam Policy Needs Renewed Exam

There are three alternatives open to the United States in Vietnam: withdrawal, military victory, and negotiated settlement. Withdrawal is now impossible, though it might have been possible at several times in the past, as for example after the death of Diem. Withdrawal is now impossible because the United States is one of the world's two major powers and therefore cannot embrace isolationism. We have world interests, like it or not. But the real question is: what is the precise nature of those interests, in this instance, in Southeast Asia and specifically, Vietnam, and how best can we realize these interests?

The second alternative — military victory in Vietnam — is both unworthy and imprudent, for several reasons. To obtain military victory would require protracted fighting, and the loss of many more American lives. American troops already bear the brunt of the fighting. The New York Times of February 24, 1966 reported an estimated 100,000 desertions from the South Vietnamese army during 1965. Despite our continued escalation, victory over the Vietcong is not yet in sight. Continued fighting also means the killing of more Vietnamese civilians, the risk of war with China and Russia, and the continued loss of U. S. prestige in many parts of the world. Moreover, a military victory would necessitate the continued presence of the United States in Vietnam, since none of the basic issues in that unhappy land would have been solved.

This leaves only one alternative open to the U. S. — the vigorous and flexible search for a peaceful settlement through negotiation. Our administration is in favor of this, but I have many questions concerning our tactics. The American position has been that North Vietnam was the aggressor. In fact, President Diem organized a Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam in 1958 and since 1960 the Saigon government, with American support, "has been smuggling saboteurs and commando teams into the North in a so-far vain effort to instigate a guerilla movement among the Northern Catholics and mountain tribesmen. The opposing sides, in short, have never recognized the 17th Parallel as a permanent boundary and have violated the frontier whenever it suited them" (Niel Sheehan, N. Y .Times Vietnam correspondent, in The New York Times Magazine, October 9, 1966, p. 132).

An article in the New York Review of Books of November 17, 1966, by Mario Rossi, titled, "U Thant and Vietnam: The Untold Story," provides much more evidence on U. S. tactics regarding efforts at negotiation. When U Thant urged us to broaden the representativeness of the Saigon regime, the United States instead sought to strengthen Ky's military dictatorship and aided Ky in suppressing protests by Buddhists and others. U Thant's efforts to initiate private conversations between Washington and Hanoi, in which Hanoi expressed an interest in the late summer of 1964, were rejected by Washington on the grounds that the news of these secret meetings would weaken the morale of the South Vietnamese government.

What has so far been lacking in our official policy is frank admission that there are discontented groups in South Vietnam — both Communist and non-Communist — who do not back the Saigon generals. If the United States favors a negotiated settlement, then we must make much explicit than we have our willingness to negotiate directly with our adversaries in the field — the Vietcong, who make up at least three-fourths of the military forces actually fighting against us. Heretofore we have offered to negotiate only with Hanoi, and have spoken as though the Vietcong and the National Liberation Front are only instruments of the Hanoi government. They are not. We must also state our willingness to include in the negotiations the other factions — the Buddhists, the Catholics, the Cao Dai, etc. These several factions, along with the Saigon regime, are the ingredients of a coalition government which would be formed to organize a general election, and to govern the country from the cease-fire until that election takes place.

I believe the United States should not be involved in the actual negotiations. These should be conducted by the Vietnamese factions themselves, under international supervision.

It is unrealistic of the United States to expect that if we offer a cease-fire, the Vietcong should in return be willing to lay down their arms and exist under the Saigon government until such time as free elections are held.

The unrealism of our Vietnam policy was pointed out by Walter Lippmann, in the Washington Post, on February 22, 1966: ". . .in my view the only live option we have ever had in southeast Asia. . . .is to help provide the material means by which a united Vietnam — probably under the rule of Ho Chi Minh, who is the one national leader of that country — could be neutral and militarily independent as regards China." Hans Morgenthau agrees: ". . .the nature of the government to be established in South Vietnam is of secondary importance in view of our interests. . . .an all-Vietnamese Communist government m a y, in view of our interests ,even be preferable to a non-Communist South Vietnamese one (Saturday Review, October 30, 1965, pp. 32-33) As Morgenthau sees them, our interest in southeast Asia are to have "a string of neutral states bordering on China, which by their vary existence would serve to contain China's expansionism" (ibid).

Since the great, nationide teach-ins of two years ago, American campuses have been relatively quiescent on Vietnam. We need a new ferment in 1967. Its objective

By Dr. R. I. Crane

U. S. Task—'Constructive Nation Building'

Dr. Robert I. Crane is Professor of History at Duke and also Chairman of the Program in Comparative Studies of Southern Asia. He is currently a member of the Executive Committee of the American INSTITUTE OF Indian Studies and also Chairman of the Joint Committee on Asian Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council.

* * *

I have been asked to state, briefly, my reservations regarding the position into which we have drifted in Vietnam. May I remark that I am a specialist on India and Pakistan and Burma ,not on Indochina (Vietnam). I have done my best to keep up with developments in Vietnam in leading newspapers and journals. I have also tried to reason carefully by analogy from somewhat similar circumstances in India under British rule. Because of space limitations I can do no more than suggest a few questions concerning our greatly increased involvement in Vietnam. I hope these questions, along with other materials in this issue of the **Duke Chronicle**, will provide the basis for a dispassionate discussion of the options available to us.

My first question about the U.S. position in Vietnam has to do with the wisdom of an enhanced military involvement in disregard of repeated warnings that while we may assist peoples in Asia to secure their sovereignty, we cannot fight such wars for them. Step by step we have allowed our forces to shoulder an ever larger share of the military role in Vietnam. In the past two weeks it has openly been stated that the U. S. Army is to do almost all of the fighting ,while the army we were to assist is to turn to internal pacification duties. To my mind this suggests that we have allowed ourselves an almost impossible mission. How can foreign soldiers hope to defend effectively what an indigenous army cannot defend with foreign aid?

We have been told a thousand times that the real "victory" is a political victory, and that this political victory has to be won not with guns but by creating a viable socio-political order in South Vietnam. This viable socio-political order — which would be defendable — rests upon structural changes and improvements amongst the peoples of South Vietnam. To date, every report I have read makes it clear that these crucial changes have yet to take place. This week we are told the army of South Vietnam is to be given the task of making these changes, but I have yet to read one solid report that credits the ability of the South Vietnamese army to do the job .The impression given is all to the contrary.

Much has been made of the fact that we are defending freedom in South Vietnam. In so far as that is true, all of us I think support our involvement. But things are not, it seems, nearly so clear cut. In fact, in a subtle sense, many of our troubles may stem from the fact that we have oversimplified what we are doing there. This oversimplification reflects our national lack of understanding of the realities and the complexities of life in the pre-modern societies of southern Asia. It is not useful to make any simple comparisons between the kinds of society with which we are familiar in our part of the world and the kinds of society to be found in southern Asia. For a host of reasons the educated American is sadly lacking in solid information and valid generalizations about these pre-modern societies. Even today the number of Americans who have had the opportunity to take a course in college on South-east Asia is but a tiny fraction of all enrollees in college. For this reason alone it has been possible, in good faith, to apply cliches to Vietnam that do not fit the realities of Vietnam. There are grave dangers when one operates on the basis of concepts that are far off the mark in terms of the realities. This is a genuine problem for all of us in trying to assess our difficulties and the potentialities in Vietnam.

I remain quite vexed by what is meant when we say we are defending freedom in Vietnam. If we mean we are defending a system of government based largely upon the kinds of political rights we take for granted here at home — then it is clear we are not doing so in South Vietnem. Neither the Diem regime nor any of its successor military junta regimes have been chosen by voters. Nor do normal civil rights of the kind guaranteed by our Bill of Rights obtain in South Vietnam. It can of course be argued that one should not quibble over legal issues at a time like this. I must, however, insist that it is rather aimless and misleading to talk of defending freedom unless it be specified what "freedom" is being defended.

Nor is this a trivial matter. If this is a political war, then the political context is at least as important as is the firepower involved. I believe the political context is of primary significance, both today and tomorrow. If we have any desire for a reasonable solution in Vietnam and if we hope to avoid an interminable involvement there, we have to think in terms of a political context and a political resolution. If that be valid reasoning, then we should examine the meaning of the word freedom which is so loosely used. For we have to assume that the people of South Vietnam have some ideas as to what they want by way of "freedom" and some notions as to what kind of relationship they prefer with the government which we currently keep in power. I do not pretend to know what those relationships might be, but the widespread reports of failure in the so-called pacification programs lead almost inevitably to the conclusion that an unstable military junta has not met the needs of the people — despite all the forms of aid we have given — in any satisfactory manner.

In fact, on the record, it seems fair to say that the military regime in South Vietnam is not only unrepresentative, but also largely unresponsive and unimaginative. How can we base policy on the hope for a viable political resolution in these circumstances?

Now, it seems to me (and I base this in good part on analogies drawn from the history of British India and Burma) almost axiomatic that alien firepower may be able to "keep the lid on", but that it can never hope to do more than that. In the 19th century it was almost enough just to keep the lid on and the trains running. By 1966, I must argue, it is not enough. We are allowing ourselves to get entrapped in a situation in which our firepower keeps the lid on while we hope for some unforseen event to solve the political conundrums we face. This raises some serious questions.

First, given this prospect, how far can and should we go in continued escalation? One must at all times balance the costs and the risks against the predictable gains of any course of action. To date we have escalated our military involvement until we are now to do almost all of the actual fighting. At each escalation we have been told that the next input would "turn the corner" in our favor. So far each escalation has led to an additional escalation but no evidence of a favorable political resolution even inside South Vietnam.

As we take over the densely populated Mekong Delta for overt American military action, we increase greatly the liabilities on our shoulders and the damage which must result for civilians in South Vietnam. This raises an agonizing question: how much damage can the people we are there to defend tolerate? Our press reports that about 5,000 civilians a month have been casualties in past months. As we turn to the great population in the Delta what will the civilian casualty rate become? In how far can the USA decide for the civilians in South Vietnam the level of losses they should put up with?

It can of course be argued that our great task is really to contain communist China. That may well be true. But one must still ask whether it is wise to contain China at the cost of South Vietnam, If there were in South Vietnam a national government clearly representative of its people — holding a mandate from its people to the extent let us say that the Government of India does from its citizens — our decision to contain China on the soil of South Vietnam with the explicit invitation of that government would carry with it a conviction that is unfortunately now lacking. To put it another way, if the situation were neat and tidy and a popular widely supported government, largely able to defend itself, were in need of our assistance, I for one would have no hesitation about giving help. But I find no such situation in South Vietnam and it makes me deeply concerned about the viability of our posture there.

Lord Roberts of Kandahar, Commander in Chief of the Indian Army, once wrote to Lord Curzon, Governor General of India, about British campaigns on the Northwest Frontier. Lord Roberts told Curzon he could not sufficiently stress the importance of fighting only in those areas where a majority of the population were not hostile to the British Indian army. He was right and his doctrine remains sound today. Even if the unstable junta who run South Vietnam are quite friendly to our presence, it remains an open question whether the population is as friendly. As the number and the impact of our soldiers grows and as the tonnage of bombs we have to drop multiplies (it is officially reported that we are already dropping as much per week as we did in any week in World War II), one has to ask in a pressing fashion whether the population will remain friendly to us and to the government we maintain. If not we are, I believe, in a blind alley despite our great firepower.

Nor is this a matter solely of the military effects of our enlarged presence there. South Vietnam also faces a growing menace from inflation and war shortages that mhurt the civilian population. In addition there are more devious but traumatic effects like those of the so-called "cargo cults" that arose in conjunction with our military presence in such places as New Guinea during World War II. This is why I raise the question of a blind alley for our well-meant effort to defend Vietnam.

For two years now we have hoped that each escalation would turn the corner for us. Actually, escalation itself was put forward as the way to solve the military problem. I must, as an historian, point out that escalation has not done what its proponents have claimed for it. So far escalation has had an opposite result. When we began our escalation, the North Vietnamese forces in the South were officially reported to be rather small in number: as we escalated so did they. When we started to bomb the North to prevent their movement south, their southward movement increased. When we began to bomb the oil depots around Hanoi so as to further reduce their southward trek, their southward trek increased. These are facts.

In all of this open record I find no evidence that the policy of escalation on which so much hope has been pinned has brought the desired results. I therefore ask, in hopes of stimulating further discussion, what reason have we to assume that further escalation can accomplish that which previous escalation has failed to accomplish?

For all of these reasons I have genuine reservations about the situation into which we have, with high motives, drifted in Vietnam. I fear that inertia and a fear of being blamed for mistakes in judgement — as well as lack of real insight into the vexed complexities of life in southeast Asia — have caused this unhappy drift. I hope an alert public discussion can cause us to reevaluate our stance. We should, it seems to me, reemphasize the significance of the political nexus within which military action must take place. We need to learn from history. The containment of communism in Europe — though assisted by the NATO shield — was largely the result of the splendid resurgence of the European nations in political, economic and cultural vigor.

The peoples of southeast Asia face vast and pressing problems ,some of which seem almost insoluble. If we concentrate too heavily upon the military problem in South Vietnam what can we do to cope realistically with the many difficulties of the other nations and peoples in the region? The containment of communism rests upon constructive nation-building tasks. To me this suggests more cooperation via the United Nations with the developing nations. This may require from us a political resolution in Vietnam.

Cease-Fire

cease-fire is a purely negative thing,
e: "You don't need your tonsils out,"
"You won't die till later,"
"What is this war all about?"—
"Don't anybody dig a latrine in that shell crater."
hat is this war all about?)
s, a purely negative thing
t everybody ceases firing anyhow.
few guys still get killed here and there.
s not the feel of Christmas in the air;
s mortar fire. "What's Christmas to a cow?"
y father used to tell that story back in Missouri.)
Sherman thought war was hell, what'd he say now?
call it a bloody piece of flippin' fury.
t only that a few guys still get killed;
u think about the last twelve hours or twenty - four
maybe forty - eight. If God and Dean Rusk had willed,
ere might have been maybe sixty young guys more
raise their stinking breaths in a shout of hurrah
fore anyone asked again: "What's this war for?"

Dr. Herman Salinger
Professor of German

the manner of John V. A. Weaver, circa 1917.)

Examination

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should not be to debate further the two now thoroughly discredited policy alternatives of withdrawal versus continued escalation and military victory. Instead, its objective should be focused on the one central question: how can we induce the NLF and Hanoi to come to the conference table, to accept the notion of a coalition government and the results of elections? Should the United States make known publically **prior to negotiations** that it accepts the idea of a coalition government to rule Vietnam until elections? U Thant, the French government, and others in contact with Hanoi believe we must make this concession, in order to enable the pro-negotiation forces in Hanoi, among the Vietcong, as well as in Moscow, to prevail over the Communist hawks. These, I believe, are the questions we should discuss fully at Duke and elsewhere, in the days ahead. Many Americans, critical of our Vietnam policy, active in earlier teach-ins, etc., have become weary of trying to steer our policy away from ever greater escalation. This attitude ignores the fact that the Johnson administration does not have a rigid commitment to any particular policy. Instead, its policy appears to be one of grasping at any straw: embracing Ky in Honolulu, partial peace offensives, the Manila conference "pacification," and so on. In this climate, there is room indeed for students and the general public to urge a more realistic strategy aimed at a negotiated settlement.

– North Reels –

(Continued from page 1)

country, agriculture was the major stumbling block of North Vietnam, and, even without the present war, would still be a major difficulty. . .

The moment of truth in the field of agriculture came when the very accurate 1960 population census told the planners in Hanoi what they had feared all along: a disastrously high 3.6 per cent yearly birth rate makes a shambles of all attempts at raising per capita food consumption, short of a crash program designed to increase both acreages and yields. A 1962 program intended to do so failed completely, by all accounts.

North Vietnam may not be starving - but its people have been on tight rations for 12 years.

In the industrial field North Vietnam has a clear advantage over the South. All of the country's useful minerals and metals seem to be north of the 17th parallel (just as all the surplus food and coffee and rubber are in the South). . .Two of the great weaknesses of the North Vietnamese industrial structure are the lack of qualified engineers and the difficulty in obtaining sufficient electrical power. . .

The Soviet Union has made the solution of North Vietnam's industrial power problem her own task, and has set up a long-range program to build a whole series of large power plants throughout the country. . .The impact of American bombing already has completely changed the complexion of the North Vietnamese economy. Targets set for the Five Year Plan ending in 1965 were, of course, not reached and no new plan has ben announced. Instead, "temporary" short-term targets are set for a given economic sector. In actual fact, this amounts simply to a maximum effort at keeping the country going under the increasing tempo of US air raids. . . The effects of the war on North Vietnam's territory have been to thwart these economic aims: the balancing of its agricultural economy and the creation of a moderate-sized industrial base. . .

Politically, North Vietnam is what it proclaims itself - a "dictatorship of the proletariat" led by middle-class revolutionaries. The liberal-sounding constitution which the Hanoi regime had proclaimed in November 1946, was replaced in 1960 by a new document full of virulent denunciations of the West and of praise for the "farsighted leadership. . .of President Ho," who holds almost unlimited powers under it. . .

But what finally does keep the country glued together under the tremendous pressures of the moment is the People's Army-the PAVN. Battle-hardened and well - trained, it is probably, man for man, one of the finest infantry forces in the world today. . .But beyond sheer fanaticism of the PAVN regular and the quality of his equipment, there are the uncontested qualities of his military commanders. . .They are not only aware of, but convinced of, the primordial importance of the political environment in which the war is fought. . .

Given what is known of North Vietnamese leadership, it seems obvious that the further escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam has made it almost impossible for the Hanoi regime to abandon the South Vietnamese Liberation Front.. . .As the war has escalated into the North, the internal propaganda has switched more and more from a theme of 'warm fraternal support" for the Southern insurgents to the concept of a single war . . . By an incredible irony, then, escalation of the war into the North may have further contributed to a "unification" of the Communist war effort as well as a large commitment by Hanoi to a settlement which it considers honorable for both itself and the Vietcong.

– Quiet War –

(Continued from page 1)

fare to the goals of government, the platoon went to work. Soon the platoon was spending the night in hamlets where government roops had never spent the night before.

The current national mass training of cadres at Vung Tau under the Ministry of Revolutionary Development is the result.

There are doubts even about whether the lip service paid at the highest levels of government is a true reflecton of the executive's understanding of the proram. Revolutionary Development involves not only the cadres from Vung Tau but a host of follow-up and complementary operations. In some of these fields there has been no effective co-operation within the government; in others, the co-operation has been less than adequate.

Pathetically little of the economic aid intended to succor refugees and to provide the good life that Revolutionary Development promises seems to get through to the hamlets. Saigon importers say that a fourth of all commodities that enter the port are stolen there, often by the military, who come at night with trucks and guns to intimidate the guards and load up.

One problem with the Revolutionary Development teams is that they often arrive from Vung Tau full of enthusiasm only to lose it in the venal atmosphere of the provinces. Many province chiefs, too, are anything but enthusiastic about revolutionary changes; there is profit in the status quo, and they employ the *teams accordingly.*

The program demands leadership, and this too often is lacking.

General Thang complains that the population fails to give adequate support and that the cadres, for their part, too often play a negative or inactive role in the defense of villages and hamlets. There is also a lack of co-ordination between cadre teams and village and hamlet administrators. Teams undertake unwise or impractical projects that sound impressive in their reports.

What the program lacks most is authority. It demands priorities that regional commanders, *province chiefs,* and others are not prepared to concede. This is not just the curse of the Revolutionary Development Program but also the whole effort *in Vietnam.*

Americans 'Powerless' To Control Own World

By HUCK GUTMAN

The Psychology of Being Powerless. Paul Goodman. Massey Lecture for the CBC, reprinted in **The New York Review of Books,** Nov. 3, 1966.

* * *

Four or five times a year something I read really shakes me up. When I read Dr. Goodman's lecture, upon the advice of Dr. Muscatine. I was more than shaken up, I was horrified, deeply, passionately. The lecture is a profoundly important analysis, and I would suggest that it is essential to any understanding of contemporary problems of any sort—international, social, domestic, educational — in this country.

Goodman's basic premise is that "history is out of control," and that the modern American feels powerless to regain a basic control over his life, especially as it is related to the complex world which surrounds him. Our society exists in a state of chronic emergency, which frustrates the individuals within it. Goodman discusses four basic reactions to this chronic emergency, each an attempt by a type of individual to deal with a situation which he feels powerless to force to a satisfactory conclusion: "the psychology of feeling that one is powerless to alter basic conditions."

The government, or administrative body, Goodman maintains, tries to "will to be in control, without adjusting to the realities." In Vietnam, this "will" continually insists we are winning the war. The "tide has turned" periodically for the last two years, but victory is no closer now than it was in 1964. The Administration follows a policy of bombing, yet despite ever-intensified bombing efforts, the effect has been negligible. Our generals continue the bombing because they will it to be effective. But it is not, the Viet Cong still have guns and supplies and the necessary fuel oil.

Goodman then analyzes the three basic ways the people of this country accept their feeling that they are powerless. Many people, especially the poor, become resigned to the situations which exist, and transfer any attempts at change to an identification with those who are in power, who appear grand and successful. But transferral of all one's hopes to another is a form of personal resignation and an acceptance of unimportance and powerlessness.

According to Goodman, much of the middle class accepts its powerlessness by retreating from the problems which they face through a personal acceptance of the power structure of the society — "which is what renders **them** powerless." They do not identify with power — represented by a particular person or a group—but with the system itself. They fail to recognize that many of the chronic emergencies which confront them are products of the structure of society, and that in affirming that structure they are entrenching the critical situation which is the cause of their anxiety and dissatisfaction.

For people such as these, "to cope with emergencies does not mean, then, to support alternative conditions, but further to support and institutionalize the same conditions." This means that solutions are always considered only if they arise within the strictures of the existent system, the system which often is the root of the problem. Thus, the United States takes those opinions which differ radically (i.e., at their root) from concensus and calls them irreleant — they are wished away, as all our problems are wished away — "until history, 'out of control', makes them relevant because they were true."

But the most frightening analysis is yet to come. Goodman has spoken of "those who unhistorically will to be in control and those who accept their powerlessness and withdraw. But there is another possibility, apocalypse, not only to accept being powerless but to expect, or perhaps wish and hasten, the inevitable historical explosion."

Goodman despairs over the people he described earlier, those who accept the system and yet resign themselves to being powerless to change its problems: the wish for destruction "is to be found among people who believe in the system but cannot tolerate the anxiety of its not working out for them."

These people are continually frustrated. And yet, part of the system, they must continually face the chronic emergencies which arise. This confrontation ,which is never alleviated, and which the individual feels powerless to affect in any way, creates increasing tension and anxiety. Ultimately, Goodman believes, the modern man, torn by anxiety and the bordom which comes of being powerless feels he can no longer confront the situation. He only wishes for it to disappear, and since he cannot solve the emergency, he wishes for it to take him completely in its power, wash him away in a relentless tide toward destruction. Man embraces destruction as the welcome end to the complexity and indecision and anxiety which formerly were the elements of his world.

Goodman concludes his lecture by explaining why he thinks most Americans accept our Vietnam policy and the pronouncements made by officials in Washington. "Yet a good majority continues to acquiesce with a paralyzed fascination. This paralysis is not indifference ,for finally people talk about nothing else. One has the impression that it is an exciting attraction of a policy that is doomed."

What bothers me about Dr. Goodman's analysis is its plausability. It is plausable. Yet Goodman can see no definite solution; nor can I. For how can one stop a nation from destroying itself, and the world, if most of the people in that nation want destruction. If there is anything which Dr. Goodman has to teach, it is that we must not be powerless. We must not just will change, or retreat from active use of power, or sit transfixed by the impending holocaust but we must actively work to make a different, better world.

SPECTRUM



"SKYLIGHT" — a color study, displayed (appropriately) against the ceiling of the Ivy Room.

Pictures By Seder Shown At Ivy Room

By ADEN FIELD

The Ivy room is currently showing an exhibit of photographs, both black and white and color by Paul Seder, a University graduate student in psychology. The exhibit, though modest in size, is high in quality, with the black and white pictures consistently achieving more coherent and impressive effects than the color pictures.

The pictures are very accessible. Their subjects are familiar things seen with a careful eye, an eye that enjoys the elements of pattern and symbol which appear in even ordinary things. For example, a series of photographs of gulls bears several different approaches.

They are splendid studies of birds, expressive of flight and freedom. Two of the pictures show starkly black gulls soaring or wheeling under bright sun. They suggest an ineffable aspiration. But such ideas are merely readings of very effective visual patterns, which work through Seder's control of his techniques. Again, at the simplest level, Seder has simply recorded unusual, intrinsically interesting views of gulls. The series will appear in the next **Archieve.**

The other pictures handle a varied subject matter — a couple in a kiss, a series of animated portraits of a girl, a man with a superbly lined face, the fantastically gnarled roots of a tree. In all these pictures (and others), Seder shows consistently his fondness for visual patterns as they appear in his personal views of real things.

The exhibit will be on display through 15 December, and all the prints are for sale at posted prices.

Duke Radio Log

The weekday schedule on WDBS, the Duke Broadcasting System, 560 AM is:

The Morning Show (rock 'n roll)	7:30-9:00 a.m.
The Record Bar Show (rock 'n roll)	1:00-5:00 p.m.
The Early Show (rock 'n roll)	5:00-7:00 p.m.
560 Report (UPI wire service)	7:00-7:30 p.m.
The University Hour (classical music)	7:30-9:00 p.m.
The Late Show (popular and folk music)	9:00-1:00 a.m.

Campus Calendar

WEDNESDAY

6:30 p.m. AISEC, The Association for the International Exchange of Students in Economics and Commerce, will meet in 208 Flowers. All people interested in finding out more about this exchange program are invited. The basic requirements are completion of the sophomore year and six hours of economics by summer '67.

7 p.m. IGC Curriculum Reform Committee open hearing in 208 Flowers. The standing committee is working with a parallel faculty committee. All interested persons are invited. The committee will also hold a hearing Friday at 2 p.m. in 204 Flowers.

7 p.m. Duplicate Bridge Club meeting in Green Room, East Duke Building. Last chance to practice before all-campus tournament Saturday at 1:30 p.m. in the Green Room.

9 p.m. University Caucus meets in 208 Flowers.

THURSDAY

7:45 p.m. Dr. Norman A. Graebner will lecture on "The Far East, 1950-54: Years of Decision," in Room 136, Social Science Building. Dr. Graebner, a distinguished student of American foreign policy, will also attend an informal coffee hour 3:15-4:15 in Room 234, Allen Building.

8 p.m. Alpha Phi Omega lost and found auction, 208 Flowers.

FRIDAY

7 p.m. International Club and Student Union party in East Campus Gym. Badminton, bridge, volleyball, basketball.